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Economic Growth without Happiness1
Most utility functions assume that higher levels of current personal income lead to higher utility. In 1974, Richard Easterlin introduced happiness data into economics and observed that their basic pattern was at odds with this assumption. Specifically, Easterlin (1974) observed that happiness responses are positively correlated with individual income at any point in time: the rich report greater happiness than the poor within the United States in a given year. Yet since World War II in the United States, happiness responses are flat in the face of considerable increases in average income. Figure 1 reports the average happiness response for repeated cross-sections of different Americans between 1975 and 1997 (with the three categorical answers assigned the numbers 1, 2 and 3). Figure 2 presents the cross-section results for the United States in 1994. A similar pattern has been observed in a large number of countries, including France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, and for different periods of time (Easterlin, 1995; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004) . In Japan, income rose by a multiple of five between 1958 and 1987, and happiness remained stationary.'
It's true that small upward trends in happiness can be detected in Italy and the Netherlands. Also, sometimes differences in happiness arise depending on which cohort or which ethnic group is followed over time Oswald, 2000, 2004) . Still, the general finding of growth without significantly greater happiness certainly raises questions about how a person's current income should enter a utility function. A number of possible responses have been offered in attempts to resolve this puzzle. We'll first review a number of explanations for which either the evidence seems weak, or which in the end shed little light on the puzzle that Easterlin (1974) identified: that happiness scores carry no meaning, that happiness scores aren't comparable across people, that people redefine their happiness scores over time, and that happiness should depend on health, the environment, leisure and variables other than income. We'll then consider two explanations for the paradox that have a stronger empirical basis: that happiness is based on relative rather than absolute income and that happiness adapts to changes in the level of income.
Are Happiness Surveys Related to True Utility1
Compared to other subjective data used regularly in some fields of economics, happiness questions have the considerable appeal of requiring only a minimum of information processing.2 But skeptics may argue that this simplicity is also a weakness because the data may be too simple and thus carry little information. The 1 For a register of happiness surveys across 112 nations, visit the World Data Base of Happiness: (http://wwwl.eur.nl/fsw/happiness/). See also Veenhoven (1993) . 2 By contrast, for example, "contingent valuation" studies of the costs of environmental damage ask people to place a subjective value on hypothetical events. Problems include the risk of people answering strategically and the possibility that they will answer ignorantly, on the basis of little or misguided information.
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Notes: Left-hand scale is the average of the answers to the quest Social Survey: "Taken all together, how would you say things ar are (3) very happy, (2) pretty happy, or (1) not too happy1" Th 0.98, from Easterlin (2004b). skeptical position seems to be: Talk is cheap, and unstructured talk as a result of open-ended questions such as "Are you happy1" is not meaningful. If the scores from happiness questionnaires are not actually related to true utility, then the Easterlin pattern of growth-without-happiness is unsurprising.
A simple test of the hypothesis that happiness data are just noise is to study whether happiness scores correlate with some other variable that we can plausibly claim is associated with true utility. For example, cross-sectional and panel studies reveal that unemployed individuals tend to report low happiness scores (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) . This outcome seems reasonable given that other "bads" like divorce, addiction, depression and violence are correlated with unemployment. The findings also suggest that happiness surveys are capturing something meaningful about true utility.
Admittedly, it is difficult to discern true utility accurately. In one famous experiment in psychology, Landis (1924) photographed students while they listened to music, looked at pornographic material, smelled ammonia or observed him decapitate a live rat. Third-party observers were unable to predict the activity by looking at the photographs. However, more recent research shows that this inability results from a failure to distinguish between ordinary smiles and the Duchenne smile, a type of smiling that involves a muscle near the eye (called orbicularis oculi, pars laterali), which can indeed distinguish between true and feigned enjoyment. Duchenne smiles are correlated with self-reported happiness (Ekman, Friesen and O'Sullivan, 1988; Ekman, Davidson and Friesen, 1990) .
Happiness answers (and Duchenne smiles) are also correlated with left frontal brain activity, which in turn appears to be connected to different forms of what we are calling true utility. Fox and Davidson (1982) , for example, show that 10-month old infants exhibit greater activation of the left frontal than of the right frontal area of the brain in response to videotapes of an actress generating happy facial expressions. In contrast, asymmetry in other parts of the brain failed to discriminate between the conditions. A good starting point for economists in the psychology literature on happiness is Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith (1999) and Diener and Seligman (2004) .
Ultimately, happiness research takes the view that happiness scores measure true internal utility with some noise, but that the signal-to-noise ratio in the available data is sufficiently high to make empirical research productive. Note that the work discussed in this section also implies that, conceptually, happiness research need not have to rely on subjective data. An example of happiness research involving suicide rates as a proxy for true utility is Stevenson and Wolfers (2003) .
However, it remains an open question as to whether happiness scores refer to current or delayed utilities.3
Can Happiness Scores be Compared1
Easterlin's (1974) observation of economic growth without increasing happiness involved comparing happiness scores of different people and at different points in time. The interpersonal comparability of happiness scores, however, is a thorny question. How much similarity across peoples' reporting of true utility needs to be assumed in happiness studies14
At one end of the spectrum, the problem of comparing happiness scores between just two individuals remains very difficult. Consider an example with Amanda and Brad, who consume various quantities of good x on a number of occasions, each time reporting a happiness score. Then imagine that a social scientist decides to estimate a linear regression "happiness equation." The result of the equation is that Brad typically registers a greater increase in happiness scores for each unit consumed than does Amanda. Does this finding mean that if one extra unit of x falls from the sky then it should be given to Brad1 Not really. Perhaps Amanda scores her true utility on a numeric happiness scale using a conversion factor equal to 1/z times the size that Brad uses.
Another way of stating the problem is to say that there may be an unobservable variable we could call "exaggeration" that is missing from the happiness equation.
If Brad exaggerates the effect on his utility of increases in x by more than Amanda does, then his regression coefficient will be biased up relative to hers. This wellknown difficulty of comparing utilities is sometimes referred to as the "qualia problem"- Harsanyi (1955) calls it the metaphysical problem-and prevents us from making interpersonal comparisons using self-reported measures.
This problem becomes worse when the happiness scores are at the top of a certain measurement scale, so that they cannot rise higher, or at the bottom of the scale, so that they cannot fall lower. Then, even if Amanda and Brad have the same happiness score-say they both choose the top category-the bounded nature of the scoring method introduces a problem when using scores to make such comparisons. These bounds can also make it appear that marginal utility is diminishing as consumption increases, when in fact the scores are hitting the top of the scale and for that reason becoming less responsive to rising true utility.
However, once the analyst moves beyond comparing just two individuals and instead starts focusing on groups, the problems of comparing happiness are much reduced. After all, the possibility of systematic differential reporting biases when two groups containing large numbers of individuals are compared could become small. This is important because a large fraction of the happiness literature in economics is based on comparing average happiness scores for large numbers of people. As one example, consider some data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. These data track happiness scores for the same people over time, based on the answer to 4 See also Ng (1996) and Tinbergen (1991) , as well as the early work advocating the use of data on individual satisfaction with the level of income by van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) . A related issue is that it remains arguable whether an arithmetic mean of individual utilities is a useful indicator of social welfare. See Harsanyi (1955) . To illustrate the most problematic case, consider the first two columns in Table 1 , which present the results of two ordinary least squares regressions, using the poorest and richest halves of the sample, where the dependent variable is the happiness score and the independent variables are the level of income and individual fixed effects. There are obviously many ways to tweak this estimation.5 But the point is that the poor half of the sample in column 1 seems to make more pleasant noises, which we call happiness data, when they have more income. (A t-test of equality of the two income coefficients is rejected at conventional levels.
Note that the shape of Figure 2 shows that the data from the United States in 1994 are broadly consistent with this result.)
The individual fixed effects included in the calculation reduce the chance that unobserved heterogeneity, like ability, exaggeration or family background, is driving our correlations. Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe (2005) address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity across individuals in a different way by using withinmonozygotic twin pair estimation with data on identical Danish twins to show that partnerships and children have appreciable persistent effects on happiness.
But problems remain, however, when exaggeration is correlated with income over time for the same individual. For example, people who become richer may become more modest about reporting how much happier they are becoming.
Thus, a politician wishing to achieve the highest average happiness and who is faced with the problem of how to distribute a windfall of one euro has only a partial use for these results. For example, the politician might take the position that the burden of proof is on the rich, who should have to make the case that they are obtaining at least 15 times more true utility from the extra euro than their happiness scores are indicating, or else the euro should go to the poor (15 = 0.12/0.008).
As another application based on these data, consider the case of a politician who has to decide which part of Germany will enjoy a shock (such as a beneficial investment project) that decreases the unemployment rate. In this case, the data are divided by region, rather than by rich and poor. Thus, the regressions in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 continue to have happiness scores as the dependent variable, but the data are now aggregated at the state level (Germany has a federal system of government in which the country is divided into semi- Table 1 How Happiness Scores Vary with Personal Income, Germany, 1985 Germany, -2000 Poor Rich Region 1 Region 2 Real income 0.12 0.008 0.09 0.11 (0.02) (0.007) (0.07) (0.08) Unemployment rate -.04 -0.03 The happiness data typically available for the United States have only three response categories. Starting in 1972, the General Social Survey carried out by the National Opinion Research Center has asked: "Taken all together, how would you say things are these days-would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy1" Before that, surveys going back to the 1940s done by the American Institute for Public Opinion and the Gallup poll asked a similar three-part happiness question, with minor differences in wording. Perhaps with only three categories to choose from, Americans re-adjust their interpretation of the happiness scale so that they tend to fall somewhere in the middle.
However, the Easterlin (1974) puzzle is also present in the German Socio-Economic Panel used in Table 1 , which has happiness data on a scale from 0 to 10 and records the answers of the same people over time. Figure 3 below plots average happiness and average real incomes for 8,649 West Germans aged from 21 to 65 years old who were followed between 1985 and 2000. The period is relatively short compared to life expectancy in Germany at the time, so it seems unlikely that a sweepingly different cultural notion of happiness has come into play. If we draw best-fit regression lines to approximate the two trends, the slope is significantly positive for the income series and significantly negative (although not large in magnitude) for the happiness series (both at the 5 percent level). Luttmer (2004) has also worried about the possibility that what people mean by "happiness" might shift over time. He uses measures of well-being like the incidence of depression, poor appetite and poor sleep that are less likely to be purely subjective and finds similar results as those obtained using standard subjective happiness data.
Although the evidence is not conclusive, there seems little reason to believe that the average person in the present is substantially happier than the average person several decades ago, but is just answering the happiness questionnaires in a similar way. economists would think about adding to the utility function have trended in the wrong way to explain why reported happiness levels have been so flat over time. Tella and MacCulloch (2003) correlate happiness with a battery of variables (including leisure, crime and the environment) that some could argue belong in the utility function and observe that, given their evolution over time, happiness should have risen even more. Thus, introducing omitted variables doesn't solve the Easterlin paradox; instead, it deepens the puzzle.
Is Happiness Based on Relative Income1
Easterlin (1974) discussed the hypothesis that people care about their income relative to that of others as an explanation for the growth without happiness phenomenon. This argument is also made in models of interdependent preferences, which trace back at least to Duesenberry (1949) and Parducci (1968) 
Does People's Happiness Adapt to Changed Circumstances1
The pattern of economic growth without increases in happiness would result also if people become accustomed over time to increases in income, as in the model of Pollak (1970) . A classic paper in psychology, Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bullman (1978) showed that a very small sample of individuals who had won between 150,000 and 11,000,000 at the lottery the previous year reported "comparable" life satisfaction levels as those who did not. They also argued that individuals who had become paraplegic or quadriplegic within the previous year reported only slightly lower levels of life satisfaction than healthy individuals. More recently, Easterlin (2004a) has shown that the evidence suggests there is complete adaptation to income but incomplete adaptation to life's events (like marriage or disability). For an insightful review of studies that have evidence on the extent of adaptation, see Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) . See also the recent evidence in Oswald and Powdthavee (2005) , Riis, Loewenstein, Baron and Jepson (2005) and the discussion in Rayo and Becker (2004) . Consider again the German data from 1985 to 2000 as presented in Figure 3 . In brief, the overall evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that an individual's happiness or utility is not just a function of income at a point in time, as in the standard model most often used by economists, but that happiness adapts to changes in income over time, and that at a point in time, happiness also comes from relative levels of income. Note that for both adaptation and relative income effects to be relevant explanations of the Easterlin (1974) paradox we would need a very specific pattern: it would have to be the case that individuals adapt to income, but do not adapt to their relative position. This pattern is consistent with Easterlin (2004a), who argues that family aspirations do not change as marital status and family size change, but that material aspirations increase commensurately with household wealth. This is also the pattern that is present in the panel data analyzed in Di Tella, Haisken-de-New and MacCulloch (2005), who show evidence consistent with strong adaptation to income (within four years) but no adaptation to (job) status.
Using Happiness Data to Evaluate Policy
To measure how policies affect social welfare, economists have traditional operated in two steps. First, they look at how policies affect behavior. Then, us these predictions, they connect policies to welfare through some theoretical mo A common problem with this approach is that, even if agreement exists on ho policy affects behavior, there is often a lack of consensus on how the conseque of policy will affect welfare.
For example, will a higher tax on cigarettes increase or reduce the welfare smokers1 A wide range of studies on the behavior of smokers have estimated their purchases of cigarettes fall when the price rises. However, this behavio effect is consistent with two models that have opposite welfare implications. In Becker and Murphy (1988) "rational addiction" model, the welfare of smoker drops as cigarettes, which they enjoy, become more expensive. However, if smo have self-control problems, then their preferences can be time-inconsistent in sense of Laibson (1997) so that they always want to quit in the future, but neve the present. A cigarette tax is able to raise the welfare of these types of smokers b providing them with a commitment device that allows them to do something they would not otherwise choose.
To resolve these ambiguous theoretical predictions, Gruber and Mullainatha (2002) match happiness data on smokers and nonsmokers from the United St and Canada to cigarette tax data from U.S. states and Canadian provinces. The exploit the fact that cigarette tax changes should only affect the happiness current and former smokers. Since they do not have data on former smokers smoking data are only available for a subset of years in their surveys, Gruber
Mullainathan compare the effect of cigarette taxes on those who are predicted smoke with those who are not. Their paper finds that a 50-cent tax per pack cigarettes would leave predicted smokers with the same level of happiness as t who are not predicted to smoke in the United States (the actual average real tax equals 31.6 cents per pack in 1999 values). They explain that it seems extremely unlikely that some form of measurement error in the happiness data can be driving their results, since the error would have to change in those states and years where cigarette taxes change and in such a way that it only affects the happiness gap between predicted smokers and nonsmokers. Thus, the evidence from happiness surveys is inconsistent with the "rational addiction" model and favors the "psychological (hyperbolic)" model.7
To provide more help to policymakers, researchers will have to be more specific about the distributional details of the proposed policies. Presumably, in the case of the tax on cigarettes even within the group of predicted smokers, the effects will vary depending on the subgroup. For example, although smokers who quit will be happier, those that do not quit will be worse off because of the increase in price (and the frustration from failing to quit with this extra incentive).
A second example where happiness data can help in evaluating policy involves changes in unemployment benefits. Some evidence suggests that the unemployment rate should decrease when unemployment benefits fall. However, there is not much guidance as to what will happen to welfare. Just as in the smoking example discussed above, there are conflicting forces within each group. Those who were unemployed but end up taking jobs as a result of the lower benefits may become better off. However, the overall effect on welfare within the unemployed is ambiguous because those that remain unemployed have their welfare reduced by the cut in benefits, but also have their welfare increased because the average duration of their unemployment spell declines. Similarly the existing pool of employed workers face a mix of consequences: they gain if lower benefits lead to lower taxes and a reduced fear of job loss, but their welfare may drop since the risk of becoming unemployed with a lower level of unemployment benefits now involves a higher personal cost. The net effect of all these consequences is hard to estimate and a lot depends on debatable theoretical arguments. However, a direct method to estimate at least a part of the consequences is to run a happiness regression for an employed person that includes the level of benefits (to proxy for the cost of risk) and the unemployment rate. In principle, a policymaker could then compare the effects on happiness for workers of losing their safety net with the gains from lower unemployment rates. In work along these lines, Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003) show that in Europe, the happiness gap between the employed and the unemployed did not narrow with increases in benefits during the period from 1975 to 1992. Again, since the estimates involve 7 More generally, an important finding in research in psychology is that people often mispredict the utility associated with the choices they face (for example, Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg and Wheatley, 1998, 2002; Riis, Loewenstein, Baron and Jepson, 2005) . Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1998) , for example, distinguish between the hedonic experience of an outcome and decision utility (the weight assigned to an outcome in a decision). In this case, inferring preferences through revealed preference may be insufficient, and happiness data may provide a measure of hedonic experience, a point emphasized in Rabin (1998) .
differences between two groups of workers within a panel, it seems unlikely that measurement error in the happiness data or omitted variables drive the results.
This evidence weighs against the theory that high European unemployment arises because higher unemployment benefits have made life "too easy" for the unemployed. For example, Krugman (1994) observes that most economists share the same diagnosis that in Europe "the relatively generous level of unemployment benefits has made workers unwilling to accept the kinds of low-wage jobs that help keep unemployment comparatively low in the United States."
Finally, some authors have used happiness data to study other, more permanent institutional features of the economy, such as the role of direct democracy.
Frey and Stutzer (2000) exploit the large cross-sectional variation in the institutional rights to political participation across the 26 Swiss cantons. They find that average happiness and an index of direct democracy in a canton are positively correlated. Intriguingly, they also find that the effect is stronger for Swiss nationals relative to foreigners (about three times), which they interpret as suggesting that it is not the policy outcome of direct democracy that matters (from which foreigners cannot be excluded) but rather the process itself that matters (since only the Swiss can participate in referenda). Happiness data can address some of the issues in the unemployment-inflation literature. Wolfers (2003) presents a comprehensive set of estimates, using data on the happiness responses of more than half a million people in a maximum of 16 European countries for the period 1973-1998 (for a total of 274 country-years). Table 2 shows his main results from a regression in which people's happiness data are the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are the unemployment and inflation rates that they are experiencing.8
The Inflation-Unemployment Tradeoff
The calculations show that inflation and unemployment both reduce happiness. The method of calculation used here-the ordered probit--takes the raw 8 Shiller (1997) approached the problem by asking people directly about why they dislike inflation. Interestingly, macroeconomics is also the focus of some of the earliest work we found using a "happiness" approach, namely that by Durkheim (1897 [1951] ) on the effect of social changes (including economic crisis) on "anomic" suicides. The estimate that a percentage p piness than a percentage point of multiple varies in different stu estimates that an additional perce much of a reduction in happiness a a smaller sample that includes coun that the coefficient on the unempl person changes their score when u is employed. Since the happiness variable for whether each person i istics) the coefficient on this vari unemployed. Therefore, to calcula the average person must be increased by adding the individual cost to the unemployed. Determined this way, all the estimates available of the happiness consequences of unemployment compared with inflation suggest that using a "misery index" with equal weights on inflation and unemployment (as is often done for policy purposes) would underestimate the costs ofjoblessness. The coefficients on the unemployment and inflation rates can be useful for policy. Consider a government that thinks it can produce a recession that increases the unemployment rate by 2 percentage points for one year and gets a permanent reduction in inflation of 1 percentage point. Wolfers (2003) points out that, using a discount rate of 6 percent for the happiness effects of inflation, this tradeoff is equivalent to an increase in the unemployment rate of 2 percentage points for one
year and a one-year drop in the inflation rate approximately equal to 18 percentage points. Should the government choose this policy1 A government that buys the assumptions on which happiness research is based would look at the estimates in Table 2 and say yes. This is because the gain coming from the one-year drop of 18 percentage points in inflation is greater than the loss coming from 4.7 multiplied by the 2 percentage point rise in unemployment. It would be a way to justify Feldstein's (1997) claim that there is widespread professional consensus on inflation's adverse effects and that these justify the short-term unemployment sacrifices that are required to reduce inflation to lower levels.9 Interestingly, Wolfers (2003) also finds evidence that individuals' happiness scores tend to be lower when the volatility of unemployment and of inflation tend to be high. He then suggests some estimates of the costs of business cycle volatility.
Political Economy
The potential uses of happiness data in political economy are vast. Such an application of happiness research can begin by studying in detail happiness responses across subsamples of people. For example, consider the literature on the "political business cycle"-that is, the theories that seek to explain business cycles by the actions of political parties to stimulate the economy at election time, even at a long-run cost, and the theories that explain the path of the business cycle by differing political preferences of the parties.
One version of this theory is built around the assumption that the main parties have different preferences over inflation and unemployment. A common approach is to assume that right-wingers care more about inflation (relative to unemployment) 9 Positive theories of inflation assume that governments choose an inflation rate to maximize social welfare, s(u, ir), where u is unemployment and 7r is inflation, subject to a Phillips curve tradeoff, whereby unemployment depends on inflation and inflationary expectations. The government faces a commitment problem, and its choice of inflation depends on the ratio of the marginal welfare effects of inflation and unemployment, which can be estimated from our happiness regression. However, identification problems (as in the Lucas critique) can arise if, for example, real money balances that depend on expectations of future inflation enter the welfare function directly. than do left-wingers (for example, Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987) . Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) use happiness data to study these assumptions. The general strategy is to separate the sample using information on political self-identification, such as the answer on a scale of 1 to 10 to the question: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you place your own views on this scale1" Respondents were classified as being left if their response was in categories 1 to 3 and right if their response was in categories 8 to 10. We then estimate the effect of the inflation and unemployment rates on the happiness of the left and right subsamples separately. A single happiness regression can also be estimated where the coefficients on unemployment and inflation are allowed to vary depending on whether the individual is left-or right-wing. Of course we must proceed with an awareness that people are not randomly selected into different political identifications and may change beliefs depending on their current economic circumstances.
The first two columns in Table 3 illustrate that the unemployment/inflation ratio is indeed higher for left-wingers than for right-wingers.10 The calculation also demonstrates some strengths of this approach. This regression helps control for other economic shocks that are contemporaneous with the macroeconomic variables in the regression and that affect the average happiness of the members of the two partisan groups by the same amount. These results also show how happiness research imposes a minimum of structure: essentially, people are asked two questions-their happiness and their political orientation. The connection with macroeconomic variables like unemployment or inflation is made later on by the researcher.
Happiness data also provide some basis for inquiring into the origin of these differences. Paul Samuelson once said (as quoted by Hibbs, 1987, p. 213) : "The difference between the Democrats and the Republicans is the difference in their constituencies. It's a class difference .... The Democrats constitute the people, by and large, who are around the median incomes or below. These are the ones whom the Republicans want to pay the price and burden of fighting inflation. The Democrats are willing to run some inflation (to increase employment); the Republicans are not." However, the results reported in the third and fourth columns, which divide the sample into the "rich," who are in the upper quarter of the income distribution, and the "poor" in the bottom quarter of the income distribution, do not support Samuelson's view. The unemployment/inflation tradeoffs of the rich and the poor are not significantly different. Further tests show that, if anything, the 10 Similar results obtain if we use the answers to "If an election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for1" and then classify parties into left and right using a standard political scientist's ideological index. Within the United States, there is also other evidence of partisan effects. Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) report that for a sample of 44 states between 1981 and 1996, higher state unemployment rates significantly decrease the happiness of the left, but not the right. "Left" respondents identified themselves as "Strong Democrat," "Not very strong Democrat" or "Independent, close to Democrat" when asked "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what1" "Right" respondents are those answering "Independent, close to Republican," "Not very strong Republican" or "Strong Republican." Country-year clusters 160 160 160 160 Source: Data are from the Euro-barometer survey ser Notes: The dependent variable is the answer to the quest satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with among a) "very satisfied," b) "fairly satisfied," c) "not method is an ordered probit regression, with standard e at the country-year level. poor tend to report lower levels of well-being This is a particularly simple test of the hy (contrast with, for example, the approach Happiness data also allow for tests that a example, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) As a final example, we note that happiness data can be used to help explain differences in economic policies between Europe and America. One common characterization is that Europeans believe less in the idea that effort pays (that is, effort is closely linked to income) than Americans, and so they support a larger public sector. Americans, in contrast, are more likely to believe that people, by and large, get what they deserve and support a smaller government (for example, Piketty, 1995) . Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) report that 60 percent of Americans believe that the poor are lazy as opposed to just unlucky, while only 26 percent of Europeans hold this belief.
These differences in background beliefs imply different public reactions to economic circumstances. Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) obtain measures of inequality and happiness for the United States for the period 1981-1996 and for Europe for 1975-1992. They observe that individuals have a tendency to report themselves less happy when inequality is high, even after controlling for individual income, year and country (or state, in the case of the United States) dummies. The effect, however, is more precisely defined statistically in Europe (where the happiness regression coefficient on inequality is more negative and the standard error lower) than in the United States. In addition, striking differences exist across groups. In Europe, the poor and those on the left of the political spectrum tick down their happiness scores when inequality is high; in the United States, the happiness of the poor and of those on the left is largely uncorrelated with inequality. Indeed, in the United States, there is some evidence that the rich-left report lower happiness scores when inequality is high. These findings are consistent with the assumption that Americans have a perception (not necessarily a reality) of living in a mobile society, where individual effort can move people up and down the income ladder, whereas Europeans believe that they live in less mobile societies. Research on these issues is particularly interesting in the context of transition economies, where perceptions of mobility may strongly affect the support for reforms and legitimacy of capitalism (Graham and Pettinato, 2001; Senik, 2004) .
Extending these ideas using micro-level data, we can test directly whether people who hold different beliefs about mobility may also differ in the effect of income on their happiness. The third wave of the World Values Survey (1995) (1996) (1997) asked more than 43,000 people across 36 countries the question, "In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little chance of escaping1" The two relevant answers are "1. They have a chance" or "2. There is very little chance." Table 4 reports the effect of real income on the happiness of those who hold the mobility belief compared to those who hold the alternative belief (No chance of escape). In this regression, happiness scores on a scale of 1-10 are the dependent variable, while the explanatory variables are real income, a dummy variable indicating whether the person believes that there is little or no chance of escaping from poverty, this variable interacted with income, a dummy variable for country and other personal characteristics. The latter include age, sex, employment and marital status. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, suggesting that lower Table 4 How 
